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Abstract— Wireless community networks that operate in the
unlicensed spectrum have emerged as a low-cost alternative
for providing high-speed wireless data services. By using WiFi
access points that are provided and managed by community
members, wireless community networks can offer high-speed
data services at a much lower cost compared with traditional
licensed band operators. However, depending on the number
of members, the quality-of-service in terms of coverage and
data rates provided by wireless community networks can be
significantly lower compared with traditional licensed band
operators. As a result, it is not clear whether wireless com-
munity networks will be able to capture a significant share of
the market for wireless data services. In this paper we use a
game-theoretic approach to model and study the evolution, and
potential market share, of wireless community networks. We
also study whether it is profitable for a licensed band provider
to complement its licensed band data service with a low-cost
service based on a wireless community network.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last few years we have witnessed a rapidly
increasing demand for high-speed wireless data services.
Traditionally, these services have been offered by cellular
wireless service providers that operate in the licensed-band of
the radio spectrum. Cellular wireless providers can guarantee
a high-quality service and good coverage. However, provid-
ing this service requires substantial investments, both for
deploying and maintaining the network infrastructure, and for
licensing the wireless spectrum. As a result, subscription fees
to high-speed wireless data services provided by a licensed-
band cellular provider tend to be high.
As an alternative to licensed-band operators, wireless
community networks have emerged as a low-cost approach to
provide high-speed wireless data service. Wireless commu-
nity networks operate in the unlicensed-band and use WiFi
access points that are operated and maintained by community
members to provide their data service. Some wireless com-
munity networks are currently operated by FON, a worldwide
WiFi community network funded by Google and Skype [2],
as well as by Free [3]. Recently, some researchers have also
shown their interests in this subject [8][1].
Although wireless community networks offer data services
at a much lower cost compared with traditional licensed-band
operators, the quality-of-service they provide might also be
much lower than that offered by licensed-band operators.
For example, the coverage of a wireless community network
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depends on the number of members it is able to attract.
As a result it is not clear whether wireless community
networks can indeed emerge as a viable alternative to cellular
wireless network providers, i.e. whether wireless community
networks will be able to attract a large enough number
of subscribers that indeed allows them to compete with
traditional licensed-band operators.
In this paper we study wireless community networks using
a game-theoretic framework. We start out by analyzing the
evolution of wireless community networks. Our analysis
suggests that wireless communities exhibit an interesting
threshold behavior: If the subscription price that the network
charges its users exceeds a certain threshold (which depends
on the initial community size), then the network will not
be able to grow, and will eventually lose all its members.
Whereas, if the price is below this threshold price, then the
community will be able to grow.
Next, we consider the competition between a licensed-
band wireless operator and a wireless community network.
For this case, our results suggest that the wireless community
networks are more competitive in areas with a high-density
WiFi access points. The intuition behind this result is that
a high density of WiFi access points is needed for the
wireless community network to provide sufficiently good
coverage to its subscribers. Finally, we study whether it is
profitable for a licensed-band provider to offer a high-speed
data service based on a wireless community networks as
a low-cost alternative to price-sensitive users. Our results
suggest that this is not the case, i.e. in order to maximize its
profit, a licensed-band provider should only offer high-speed
data service through an appropriately priced licensed-band
service. The intuition behind this result is that a unlicensed
service based on a wireless community network will add
market share, but also erodes profits as some users will
switch from the more expensive licensed-band service to the
low-cost service offered by the community network.
The paper is organized as follow. In Section II we discuss
our economic model for wireless service providers and we
also address the scenario that we consider in this paper
for mobile subscribers. Section III, IV, and V present our
analytical models for users’ payoff and wireless providers.
In Section VI, we address our main results and contributions.
We analyze the revenue of traditional licensed band operators
in Section VII. We then evaluate the dynamics of wireless
community in Section VIII. In Section IX and X, we analyze
using a game-theoretic approach the competition and coop-
eration between these operators. Finally we conclude with
Section XI.
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II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider the situation where users can obtain high-
speed data service either through a licensed-band cellular
wireless provider, or an unlicensed-band wireless community
network. In the following, we will refer to the traditional
licensed band operator as an LBO (for licensed-based opera-
tor), and the wireless community network as SCO (for social
community operator). The LBO provides the service through
a fixed infrastructure, thus guaranteeing both good coverage
and high-data rates. The SCO, on the contrary, relies on WiFi
access points owned by community members to provide the
service. To obtain good coverage, the community network
has to be able to attract a large number of subscribers.
Users decide which operator to join, based on both the
subscription fee that the operator charges and the quality-
of-service the operator provides. We denote with P the
subscription fee charged by the LBO, and with Ps the fee
charge by the SCO. Similarly, we denote with Q the quality-
of-service provided by the LBO, and by Qs the quality-of-
service of the SCO. Without loss of generality we assume
that Q = 1. In this case, Qs models the quality-of-service
provided by the wireless community networks relative to the
one provided by the the licensed-band operator. We describe
the exact model for the quality-of-service Qs in Section III.
We assume that operators will decide on the subscription
price in order to maximize their profit. For our analysis, we
consider the following two pricing models.
Definition 1: Under the static pricing models, operators
have a fixed subscription fee that does not change over time.
Definition 2: Under the dynamic pricing model, operators
can change their subscription fees at regular intervals such
as every month, or every year.
For these pricing models, we study the following ques-
tions.
1) What are the subscription fees that operators should
charge to maximize their profit?
2) If a licensed-band operator and a wireless community
network compete with each other in a given area,
what is the equilibrium market share of each operator,
and what are the subscription fees charged at market
equilibrium?
3) Should a licensed-band operator complement its ser-
vice with a low-cost service based on a wireless com-
munity network? If so, what subscription fee should it
charge for each service, and what is the market share
that each service will obtain?
We study the above questions using a game-theoretic
model as described in Sections III-V. As part of the model,
we have to specify precisely (1) the quality-of-service pro-
vided by the wireless community network (see Section III),
(2) the profit an operator obtains (see Section IV), and
(3) how users decide to which operator to subscribe (see
Section V).
For our analysis, we assume that there are a total of N
users that potentially subscribe to a data service. At discrete-
time intervals t = 0,1,2..., users can decide to which operator
they want to subscribe. We denote with n(t) the fraction of
users that subscribe at time t to the licensed-band operator
and with ns(t) the fraction of users that subscribe at time
t to the wireless community network. Note that n(t) = 1
states that at time t all users subscribe to the licensed-band
operator. Users are allowed to decide to not subscribe to any
operator and we can have that ns(t)+n(t) < 1.
III. QUALITY-OF-SERVICE PROVIDED BY THE WIRELESS
COMMUNITY NETWORK
In our analysis, we assume that the quality-of-service that
is provided by the wireless community network depends on
the faction of users ns that subscribe to its service. Intuitively,
the larger the number of users that join the community
network is, the better the coverage and the quality-of-service
Qs provided by the network is. However, if the number of
users in the community network becomes too large, then the
quality-of-service Qs may drop due to interference between
WiFi access points in the community network. To capture
this behavior, we consider in our analysis the four models
of Fig. 1 to characterize the relation between the fraction of
users ns that subscribes to the community network and the
quality-of-service Qs of the wireless community network.
Model-A of Fig. 1 is the simplest model, and Model-D is
the most sophisticated (albeit still very simple).
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Fig. 1. Relation between the quality-of-service Qs provided by the wireless
community network and the fraction of users ns that subscribe to the wireless
community network.
Model-A assumes a linear relation between the fraction of
users ns that subscribe to the wireless community networks
and the quality-of-service Qs. Furthermore, when ns = 1, then
the quality-of-service of the wireless community network is
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as good as the one provided by the licensed-band operator,
i.e. we have Qs(1) = 1.
Model-B is similar to Model-A, however even when all
users subscribe to the wireless community network and ns =
1, the quality-of-service that the wireless community network
can provide is strictly worse than the one of the licensed band
operator, i.e we have Qs(1) = λ < 1.
Under Model-C, the wireless community network achieves
the same quality-of-service as the one of the licensed band
operator, as long as at least a fraction equal to 1/λ of the
users joins the community networks.
Finally, under Model-D the quality-of-service of the wire-
less community network deteriorates when more than a
fraction 1/λ of the users joins the community networks. This
degradation in the quality-of-service models the situation
where congestion among users, and interference between
WiFi access points, in the community network reduces the
achievable data rates.
Note that the parameter λ in the above model can be
interpreted as the density of WiFi access points in a region.
The higher the density λ is, the lower the fraction of users
that have to join the wireless community network in order to
provide full coverage (as in Model-C), or create interference
(as in Model-D) is.
IV. USER UTILITIES
Suppose that a given user v subscribes to the licensed-band
operator. Then we assume that the total utility (or payoff) that
user v obtains is given by
uv = av−P (1)
where P is the subscription fee (price) of the licensed band
operator and av models the utility that user v obtains under
the quality-of-service Q = 1 of the licensed band operator.
Similarly, the total payoff that user v obtains when sub-
scribing to the wireless community network is given by
usv = avQs−Ps (2)
where Qs is the quality-of-service provided by the wireless
community network and Ps is its subscription fee.
Note that we can interpret av as a user type parameter
that characterizes the sensitivity of user v towards quality-
of-service, which determines the willingness of a user to
subscribe to a given service provider. The sensitivity towards
quality-of-service could obey different distributions over the
set of users. In our analysis, we use a probability density
function to characterize the fraction of users with a given
user type parameter av as illustrated in Fig. 2.
A given user v only subscribes to a data service if the
resulting payoff is positive, i.e. if
max{av−P,avQs−Ps}> 0.
If both payoffs for the licensed band operator and the
wireless community networks are positive, then user v will
subscribe to the service that provides the higher payoff.
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Fig. 2. Different probability density functions for the user type av. Graph
(a) is the beta distribution with different parameters. For our analysis, we
will mostly use the uniform distribution over an interval [α,β ] as given in
graph (b).
V. PAYOFF OF THE WIRELESS SERVICE PROVIDERS
We denote with u and us, the payoffs of the licensed-band
operator and wireless community network, respectively.
The payoff u of the licensed-band operator is given by
u = N ·n ·P− c, (3)
where N is the total number of users, n is the fraction of
users that subscribe at time t to the licensed-band operator,
and c models the operation costs of the licensed-band
service provider. The cost c is the fixed cost used to maintain
and operate the infrastructure.
Similarly, the payoff of the wireless community network
operator is given by
us = N ·ns ·Ps− cs. (4)
Note that the fixed cost cs to operate the wireless community
network is much smaller than the cost c for the licensed-
band operator as the infrastructure to provide wireless access
is provided by the community members.
VI. MAIN RESULTS
In this section we provide an overview of the main results
that we obtained under the above models. We evaluate the
model in two scenarios. Throughout this paper, we assume
510
Authorized licensed use limited to: EPFL LAUSANNE. Downloaded on March 01,2010 at 06:16:48 EST from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. 
that av is uniformly distributed in [α,β ] (i.e. f (av) = 1β−α ),
where α ≥ 0 and this distribution is known to the operators.
First we consider a monopoly scenario where there exists
only one operator in the service area. We analyze the revenue
of LBO and concluded that its revenue depends on the
distribution of user types. We also calculate the optimal
pricing strategy for LBO that maximizes its revenue, i.e.
Popt = max{α,β/2} as shown in Section VII.
The dynamics of SCO in monopoly scenario depends not
only on the distribution of user types, but also on its initial
quality-of-service Qs[0] and the relation between the number
of subscribers and provided quality-of-service. Hence, we
use the four types of functions that can model the relation
between the quality-of-service of the SCO and the number
of its subscribers as shown in Fig. 1. As discussed in Sec-
tion III, our quality-of-service models can also characterize
the situations where there is collision between the access
points and among subscribers, which reduces the achieved
data rate of subscribers. Using these models, we first identify
the equilibrium points of SCO quality-of-service where the
quality-of-service of the community could potentially con-
verge to them. Considering the dynamics of SCO and its
equilibrium points, we then compute the optimal subscription
fee with static and dynamic price strategy which maximize
the revenue of SCO. We show that for any given distribution
of user type and initial quality-of-service, the operator can
obtain the optimal price if he knows the relation between
its number of subscribers and its quality-of-service in the
service area. The calculated optimal prices also depends on
the initial quality-of-service and distribution of user types
for all quality-of-service models. For example, if the initial
quality-of-service is small, then the SCO needs to choose a
subscription fee small enough in order to obtain more sub-
scribers and increase its quality-of-service. Whereas, when
the initial quality-of-service is large enough, the optimal
pricing strategy does not depend on initial quality-of-service
(e.g., Popts = 2λ9 β
2
β−α that depends only on distribution of user
types and quality-of-service model).
Second, we consider the co-existence of a LBO and a
SCO. We model this scenario with a game-theoretic approach
and compute the operators’ best responses in term of their
subscription fees. We show that under certain conditions
there exists a Nash equilibrium for the market share between
two operators and we calculate their respective payoffs at this
equilibrium. The Nash equilibrium strategy profile depends
on distribution of user types and quality-of-service model
of wireless community as presented in Section IX. These
results could help operators to select their best strategy in
competition with other operators in any given service area
and for any given distribution of user types.
We finally evaluate the potential benefits of deploying
two wireless access services by one operator and we show
that under uniform distribution of user types (no matter
what α and β are) and with quality-of-service Model-A
there is no interest for an operator to deploy both services
simultaneously. In this case, the optimal pricing strategy of
the operator corresponds to the one of LBO.
In summary, using our model we are able to answer
the questions that presented in Section II. This means that
according to our results the operators can calculate the
optimal pricing strategies that maximizes their payoffs as
a function of distribution of user types and their quality-
of-services. The operators are also able to find the Nash
equilibrium for market share if they coexist in the same
service area and calculate the corresponding subscription
fees. Finally, they are able to examine the potential benefits
of deploying both wireless access services at the same time
for a given service area and distribution of user type.
VII. PROFIT MAXIMIZATION OF THE LICENSED BAND
OPERATOR
Consider the situation where the LBO is the only wireless
access provider in a given area. For this case, we are
interested in determining the optimal price Popt that the
LBO should charge per unit of time in order to maximize
its revenue. Note that under a given price P, only user for
which the payoff ulv given by Equation (3) is non-negative
subscribes to the LBO. For any given distribution of user
type, the fraction of users n that subscribe to the LBO under
price P can be calculated by (recall that Q = 1 for LBO):
n = Prob{av > P}=
∫
∞
P
f (av)dav. (5)
For example, one can prove that the optimal subscription fee
for the uniform distribution of user types over [α,β ] is Popt =
max{α, β2 }. The fraction of users nopt that subscribes to the
LBO under the price Popt is given by n
opt
 = max{1, 12 ββ−α }.
The above results show that the optimal price and the
number of subscribers of an LBO depend on the distribution
of user types.
VIII. EVOLUTION OF THE WIRELESS COMMUNITY
NETWORK
Next, we assume that the SCO is the only wireless access
provider and we study the evolution of its network. Again
we assume that user v will subscribe to this operator at time
t, if and only if usv is strictly greater than zero for a given
quality-of-service Qs[t−1]. Similar to the LBO we calculate
the fraction of subscribed users at time t by
ns[t] = Prob{av > Ps/Qs[t−1]}=
∫
∞
Ps/Qs[t−1]
f (av)dav. (6)
Note that if the initial quality-of-service is equal to zero
(i.e., Qs[t−1] = 0) the wireless community never forms. We
denote the difference in terms of quality-of-service between
two time steps t and t−1, by ΔQs = Qs[t]−Qs[t−1], where
positive and negative values of ΔQs express the improvement
and degradation of the provided quality-of-service of SCO
at time t, respectively. We also define the equilibrium of an
SCO as follows:
Definition 3: For given values of Ps and Qs[t−1], the SCO
is in an equilibrium point Qeqs , if ΔQs = 0.
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In the following sections we evaluate the dynamics of SCO
under different quality-of-service models, shown in Fig. 1.
Recall that av is uniformly distributed in [α,β ] (Fig. 2(b))
but the results can be extended to more general cases with
different distributions of user types.
A. Evolution of Wireless Community with Model-A
Using Model-A, we can calculate the number of sub-
scribers and provided quality-of-service by:
Qs[t] = ns[t] = 1β −α (β −max{α,
Ps
Qs[t−1]}) (7)
Consequently, ΔQs can be expressed as follow:
ΔQs = Qs[t]−Qs[t−1]
= −(β−α)Q
2
s [t−1]+β ·Qs[t−1]−Ps
(β−α)Qs[t−1] , (8)
In [4], a thorough study for the dynamics of commu-
nity operator with Model-A is presented. The commu-
nity operator has potentially four equilibrium points (i.e.,
Qeqs ) with Model-A; Qeqs = {0,Qs,1,Qs,2,1}, where Qs,1,2 =
β±√β 2−4(β−α)Ps
2(β−α) .
We also prove that, under different subscription fees and
initial quality-of-service, the quality-of-service of the SCO
can converge to one of the above equilibrium points. Fig. 3
illustrates the dynamics of SCO for any given initial quality-
of-service at time t − 1 (i.e., Qs[t − 1]) and subscription
fee Ps, when β > 2α . We also observe that if the price
selected by SCO is such that Qs[t − 1] is less than Qs,1,
then the SCO can never increase its quality-of-service and
consequently, the proportion of subscribers and its revenue.
In other words, limt→∞ Qs[t] = 0. Note that we also prove
that the convergence of SCO is monotonous [4].
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Fig. 3. Dynamics of SCO when β > 2α with Model-A: (a) 0 < Ps ≤ α ,
(b) α < Ps < β
2
4(β−α) , (c) Ps = β
2
4(β−α) , (d) Ps > β
2
4(β−α) .
Considering the dynamics of SCO under static price, we
can also derive the optimal static price that maximizes the
payoff as well as market share of the SCO. This optimal
price (i.e., Popts ) is a function of initial quality-of-service (i.e.,
Qs[0]) and distribution of user type. For example, we show
in [4] that if Qs[0]≤ αβ−α then Popts = Qs[0] · (β − (β −α) ·
Qs[0]). Or the optimal static price is Popts = α for 2α < β ≤
3α and it is Popts = 29
β 2
(β−α) when β > 3α .
In summary, our results show that the initial quality-of-
service Qs[0], and the distribution of user types determine
the range of optimal static prices from which the SCO can
select its price. However, when the distribution of user type
is wide enough (β > 3α) and Qs[0]> αβ−α , the optimal price
does not depend on the initial quality-of-service.
We also evaluate a dynamic pricing strategy of community
network in [4]. This means that SCO adjusts its price Ps at
time t to follow the evolution of its network. The essential
difference between static and dynamic pricing is that with
dynamic pricing the SCO can maintain a lower price until
a desired quality-of-service is reached and then fine-tune
the price. The price at each time instance t is a function
of quality-of-service at time t− 1. As ΔQs must be strictly
positive, the SCO maintains the increase of the quality-of-
service by selecting appropriate dynamic prices Ps[t] at time
t, such that,
Ps[t] =−(β −α)Q2s [t−1]+βQs[t−1]− ε (9)
where ε is a small positive value. Similar to the static price
strategy, two main scenarios can be distinguished.
We also calculate the optimal dynamic price strategies
and corresponding final quality-of-service. For example, we
show that if β > 3α the best price and quality-of-service that
maximizes the SCO payoff, i.e., Qopts = 23 ββ−α , P
opt
s = 29
β 2
β−α ,
and uopts = 427
β 3
(β−α)2 − cs.
B. Evolution of Wireless Community with Model-B and
Model-C
As it is shown in Fig. 1 (b) and (c), we use the following
simple relation between Qs and ns to model these situations:
Qs[t] = min{1,λns[t]}, ∀λ > 0
Again we can calculate the quality-of-service Qs[t] of the
SCO at time t as a function of the quality-of-service Qs[t−1]
at the previous time step. In particular, we have that
Qs[t] = min{1, λβ −α (β −max{α,
Ps
Qs[t−1]})} (10)
Similar to Model-A, we have studied (a) how the quality-
of-service Qs[t] evolves over time under a fixed price Ps
and (b) what price Popts the SCO should charge in order
to maximize its revenue. The detailed results are available
in [5].
Withe these models, the wireless community has still four
equilibrium points Qeqs = {0,Qs,1,Qs,2,1} where Qs,1,2 =
βλ±√β 2λ 2−4(β−α)Psλ
2(β−α) . This shows that the equilibrium points
of quality-of-service are the function of λ as well.
Our results show that the dynamics of SCO with Model-B
and Model-C are quite similar to that of Model-A and de-
pends on initial quality-of-service and selected subscription
fee as well as λ .
For example, if β − 1λ (β −α) < Ps < β
2λ
4(β−α) and Qs[0] <
Qs,1 then we have that limt→∞ Qs[t] = 0. Or with the same
conditions on price if Qs[0] > Qs,1 then limt→∞ Qs[t] = Qs,2.
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Similar to Model-A we have also calculated the optimal
static prices with which the social community operator can
maximize its payoff at one of the defined equilibrium points.
For example, if Qs[0] ≤ λ ββ−α − 1, then Popts = Qs[0] · (β −
1
λ (β −α) ·Qs[0]) and nopts = 1.
Note that the optimal price Popts depends on the initial
quality-of-service; the intuition behind this is that when the
initial quality-of-service Qs[0] is small, then the SCO needs
to choose a subscription fee small enough in order to prevent
the quality-of-service Qs[t] to converge to 0. Whereas, we
show that if the initial quality-of-service is large the Popts =
2λ
9
β 2
(β−α) which only depends on α , β , and λ , but not on the
initial quality-of-service Qs[0]. Similar to Model-A, we also
calculate the optimal dynamic price strategy for Model-B
and Model-C in [5].
C. Evolution of Wireless Community with Model-D
As it is shown in Fig. 4, with Model-D the quality-
of-service of community increases when the fraction of
subscribers is less than 1/λ and we obtain the maximum
quality-of-service qmax when the fraction of subscribers is
equal to 1/λ . For any given initial quality-of-service Qs[0]
we can identify four types of evolution for the wireless
community. These scenarios have been shown in Fig. 4 and
can be summarized as following:
1) The number of subscribers is increased whereas the
quality-of-service is decreased.
2) The number of subscribers and the quality-of-service
are increased. The final fraction of subscribers is larger
than 1/λ .
3) The number of subscribers and the quality-of-service
are increased. The final number of subscribers is
smaller than 1/λ .
4) The number of subscribers and the quality-of-service
are decreased.
We can again calculate the ΔQs with Equation (8) and
find the conditions on subscription fee with which the above
scenarios can take place. Our evaluations show that the
operator can select a suitable subscription fee to increase
its quality-of-service and revenue and to avoid potential
collisions between its access points. Fig. 4 shows the relation
between the selected subscription fee and its corresponding
evolution scenario. Note that the thresholds Ti, i = 1,2,3
depend on λ , α , β , qmax, qmin, and the initial quality-of-
service.
IX. MARKET SHARE OF WIRELESS COMMUNITY
NETWORKS IN A COMPETITIVE MARKET
In this section, we consider the situation where an LBO
and an SCO co-exist in a given service area and compete
for mobile users to subscribe to their service. We model
this situation as a non-cooperative pricing game where two
operators are the players. The operators compete through
their subscription price and the the strategy of operator i in
the game is given by its price Pi. We also assume that the
relation between the number of subscribers and the provided
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Fig. 4. Relation between provided quality-of-service and number of
subscribers for wireless community operators with Model-D and all possible
evolution scenarios. For example if the subscription fee is bigger than T3,
the quality-of-service and number of subscription will be decreased.
quality-of-service of community is modeled by Model-B
and Model-C. The evaluation of this game for Model-A is
presented in [4].
Again we assume that users make decisions at discrete
time steps t = 1,2, · · · . Recall the definition of the utility uiv
that user v achieves when it subscribes to a provider i∈{,s}.
Given subscription fees P and Ps, and observing the quality-
of-service Qs[t − 1] of the SCO at time t − 1, user v will
choose at time t the provider i, which leads to the largest
utility uiv at time t. Of course, user v will only subscribe to
this provider if the resulting utility is non-negative; otherwise
the user will not subscribe to any provider. Let n[t] and
ns[t] the resulting fraction of users that subscribe to the LBO
and the SCO, respectively, at time t. Considering the payoffs
of two operators, the Nash equilibrium [6][7] for the above
game is given as follows.
Definition 4: The price pair (P∗ ,P∗s ) constitutes a Nash
equilibrium if for each operator i ∈ {,s} we have
ui(P∗i ,P
∗
j )≥ ui(Pi,P∗j ), ∀Pi ≥ 0. (11)
In other words, at a Nash equilibrium, none of the oper-
ators has an incentive to unilaterally change its subscription
fee as this would not increase its payoff. If the Nash
equilibrium exists for the defined game we can also define the
equilibrium quality-of-service and market sharing as follow:
Definition 5: If the price pair (P∗ ,P∗s ) constitutes a Nash
equilibrium then Q∗s (P∗ ,P∗s ) is an equilibrium quality-of-
service. Similarly, n∗(P∗ ,P∗s ) and n∗s (P∗ ,P∗s ) are the equi-
librium market sharing.
In the following we study whether there exists a Nash
equilibrium for the above game. To simplify the analysis,
we assume that α = 0.
Theorem 1: Suppose that α = 0. If λ ∈ (0,3) then there
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exists a unique Nash equilibrium given by
(P∗ ,P
∗
s ) =
(
β
2
· 1−Q
∗
s
1− Q∗s4
,
βQ∗s
4
· 1−Q
∗
s
1− Q∗s4
)
(12)
where Q∗s = 2−
√
4−λ . The fraction of users that subscribe
to the SCO at the Nash equilibrium is given by n∗s = 1λ Q∗s =
1
2+
√
4−λ , and the fraction of users that subscribe to the LBO
is given by n∗ =
2
2+
√
4−λ .
If λ ≥ 3, then there exists a unique Nash equilibrium (P∗ =
0,P∗s = 0) with Qs(P∗ ,P∗s ) = 1. However the fraction of users
that subscribe the each operator are not uniquely determined.
In particular, any market share n∗ and n∗s such that n∗s ≥ 1/λ
and n∗ +n∗s = 1 may be realized at a Nash equilibrium.
The above analysis implies that there always exists a
unique Nash equilibrium. For λ ∈ (0,3) the market share
of each provider is uniquely determined. Furthermore, for
λ ∈ (0,3), we have that (a) the market share (i.e. the fraction
of users that subscribe to an operator) of both the LBO and
SCO increase as λ increases and (b) the market share of
the LBO is always twice as large as the market share of the
SCO.
The subscription fees (P∗ ,P∗s ) charged at a Nash equilib-
rium tend to decrease as λ increases. This suggests that the
SCO influences the pricing behavior of an LBO, and that the
presence of an SCO in the service area with a dense network
of WiFi access points might be able to significantly reduce
the fees charged for wireless access.
X. MARKET SHARE OF WIRELESS COMMUNITY
NETWORKS IN A COOPERATIVE MARKET
The above service providers can also cooperate to obtain
more subscribers and provide better service. In other words,
the operators cooperator to maximize the total throughput
ut = us +u.
Let’s consider a uniform distribution of user types with
Model-A for the relation between quality-of-service and
number of subscribers. Then if both operators have a market
share, we can write their payoffs as following:
u =
N
β −α (β −
P−Ps
1−Qs )− c (13)
us =
N
β −α (
P−Ps
1−Qs −
Ps
Qs )− cs (14)
We then find the Ps and P that maximize ut . Using
Equation (13) and (14), we obtain a pair (P∗s ,P∗ ) that
maximizes the total payoff:
(P∗s ,P
∗
 ) = (
βQs
2
,
β
2
) (15)
Finally, by introducing P∗s and P∗ in ut , we obtain u∗t = u∗ .
In other words, a global operator (who has both licensed band
and community network) will not deploy a community for
the uniform distribution of user types as it does not bring
any added value. Note that its optimal subscription fee and
payoff corresponds to the one of LBO in monopoly scenario
presented in Section VII. The evaluation of cooperation
for other distribution of user types and quality-of-service
models is a part of our future work. This will show how
traditional operators can relay on community networks as a
complimentary service to increase their benefits.
XI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have studied how the evolution of social
community networks is conditioned by the initial provided
quality-of-service, the subscription fee and user sensitivity
to the provided quality-of-service. In a monopoly, we have
identified the optimal static and dynamic pricing strategies
for the wireless community with different models of quality-
of-service for wireless community. Our model can help
wireless communities to determine when the initial quality-
of-service is sufficient and then determine which price to
set. The model distinguishes pricing strategies for different
distribution of user types and different models of quality-of-
service for wireless communities.
We have also studied the coexistence of the SCO and
the LBO. We investigated the existence Nash Equilibrium.
We have computed the prices that the operators should use
to be at the identified Nash Equilibrium. We have also
analyzed the cooperation between the operators using a
game-theoretic approach. The results that we obtained are
intuitive, suggesting that the simple model that we used
is able to capture the main features of the competition or
cooperation between a LBO and a SCO.
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